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Abstract 
Psychological treatment and assessment necessarily rely on patients’ recall. Yet several empirical 
studies have documented a gap between memory and real-life experience (i.e., memory–
experience gap; MeG). We investigated and compared the MeG of sadness, social anxiety, 
happiness, and physical activity for participants diagnosed with a major depressive disorder 
(MDD), a social phobia (SP), and participants without such diagnoses (CG). 
  The study included 118 participants diagnosed with a MDD, 47 with a SP, and 119 CG. 
Using event-sampling methods (ESM), participants were asked via smartphone to report their 
experiences throughout a week and then to recall those again retrospectively at the end of the 
study week.   
  Results indicate significant differences in the MeG with respect to the experience that 
was salient to them (e.g., MDD group – sadness; SP group – social anxiety; CG group – 
happiness). Furthermore, all groups showed a MeG for physical activity and, the results indicate 
significant group differences in the magnitude of the MeGs. 
 This study demonstrated the presence of a MeG in individuals in a MDD, SP, and CG 
group and in positive and negative affective experiences. Differential patterns across the samples 
contribute to a better understanding of this gap and its implications. 
 
Keywords: Memory–Experience Gap, Event Sampling Methodology, Major Depressive 
Disorder, Social Phobia
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General or Specific? The Memory-Experience Gap for individuals diagnosed with a major 
depressive disorder or a social phobia diagnosis, and individuals without such diagnosis. 
 
Our memory is not a perfect representation of the past, and recalling experiences is often 
biased. The difference between a person’s in vivo experience and retrospective evaluation of that 
same experience has been referred to as the memory–experience gap (MeG; Miron-Shatz, Stone, 
& Kahneman, 2009). Clarifying the nature and prevalence of this gap is crucial to accurately 
interpret retrospectively recalled clinical and scientific data. Previous studies have focused either 
on part of the general populations or on individuals with a mental diagnosis separately when 
assessing the MeG. But comparing these two populations is crucial to gaining more knowledge 
about the specificity (the MeG is only present for a distinct population) or generalizability (the 
MeG exists across different populations) of the MeG.  
Previous research on memory biases suggest on the one hand that some memory biases 
permeate human cognitive processes. According to this view, human beings ‘are prone to 
overestimate how much they understand about the world and to underestimate the role of chance 
in events’ (p. 17, Kahneman, 2011). Therefore, one might conclude that memory biases are a 
general phenomenon. However, on the other hand, studies have also reported population-specific 
biases. For example, participants with a diagnosis of a major depressive disorder (MDD) have 
been shown to be more likely to falsely recall negative words during memory tests compared to 
participants in a control group (Joormann, Teachman, & Gotlib, 2009). Cognitive biases have 
furthermore been reported in individuals with symptoms of social phobia (SP), especially for 
threatening stimuli. During a visual-probe task, individuals diagnosed with SP showed slower 
reaction times when angry faces were displayed than participants in the control group (Mogg, 
Philippot, & Bradley, 2004), leading to a bias towards social threat cues. Furthermore, some 
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research suggests that some memory biases are present across all individuals (general), but are 
larger for specific populations (specific). For example, it has been shown that all individuals tend 
to better remember negative than positive events (Ganzach & Yaor, 2019; Kreitler & Kreitler, 
1968). Additionally, recollection of negative affect has been shown to be influenced by negative 
emotional peaks (high negative emotional peaks are linked with higher retrospective recall of 
negative affect; Ganzach & Yaor, 2019),  while the retrospective recollection of positive affect is 
more affected by the end affect (retrospection of positive affect is overestimated when the last 
affect was also positive; Ganzach & Yaor, 2019). As such in line with previous studies, one 
might expect that all individuals show a higher MeG for negative affect, represented by a 
overestimation, compared to positive affect (Ganzach & Yaor, 2019; Miron-Shatz et al., 2009). 
Further, some individuals – for  example individuals with symptoms of depression – will have an 
even higher MeG for negative affect compared to others, because they report higher negative 
daily affect (higher negative peaks) and more unpleasant events (Bylsma, Taylor-clift, & 
Rottenberg, 2011). However, to our knowledge the MeG for different experiences has not been 
compared for individuals with depression or anxiety and individuals without a mood or anxiety 
disorder, therefore it remains unclear whether indeed the MeG (i.e. the end product of these 
memory biases) itself is general or observable only in some individuals with certain memories or 
both. 
Previous studies have tested the presence of a MeG for patients using diagnostic-specific 
stimuli, such as pain, panic attacks, binge episodes in eating disorders, tobacco consummation 
and obsessive-compulsive symptomatology, and most, but not all, found a MeG. For example, 
individuals meeting the threshold or subthreshold for an eating disorder and individuals with a 
diagnosis of a chronic pain disorder retrospectively recalled more pain and binge episodes than 
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were collected through event-contingent and time-prompt electronic diaries (Stein & Corte, 
2003; Stone, Broderick, Shiffman, & Schwartz, 2004). Patients with panic disorders and 
agoraphobia also retrospectively overestimated panic frequency before treatment when compared 
to a self-monitored paper and pencil diaries (De Beurs, Lange, & Van Dyck, 1992; Margraf, 
Taylor, Ehlers, Roth, & Agras, 1987). Another study by Shiffman et al., (1997) identified a MeG 
(overestimation) for tobacco consumption in individuals smoking who intended to quit smoking 
using an event sampling methodology (ESM) with a palm size computer. On average, 
participants in this study retrospectively overestimated the number of cigarettes they consumed 
during smoking lapses as well as their negative effect, suggesting that the MeG applies for at 
least this observable experience and population. Interestingly, one study examining the MeG for 
patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder could not confirm a MeG (Gloster et al., 2008). 
Participants showed an accurate recollection of diagnostically specific experiences in this 
population. This accuracy may be due to the specific characteristics of the obsessive-compulsive 
disorder population or because this study uses time-stamped via smartphone assessed event-
sampling methodology (ESM).  
Other studies also suggest the presence of a MeG in participants not selected for mental 
disorders. A study by Tadic, Braam, VanVliet, and Veenhoven, (2013), for example, showed an 
MeG by presenting a discrepancy between the retrospective recall of happiness and the in vivo 
reported level of happiness in adolescents from the general population. The MeG thus consisted 
in a retrospective overestimation of the levels of happiness. Miron-Shatz and collegues (2009) 
provided another example of the MeG for happiness. In this study, female participants 
retrospectively felt happier and friendlier compared to their levels of happiness reported within 
specific experiences. The study by Miron-Shatz and collegues (2009) furthermore underlined the 
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presence of a MeG for feelings of anger and tension (referred to as unpleasant experiences). 
Using the day-reconstruction method, experiences of anger and tension were retrospectively 
overestimated by the participants, and the MeG was found to be larger for unpleasant than 
pleasant experiences.  
Summarizing, studies have found a MeG, usually in the direction of overestimation, for 
symptom-specific experiences for patients with diagnosis and more generalized emotions for 
individuals of the general population or individuals not selected for mental disorders. However, 
as studies have not directly compared the MeG in individuals with and without diagnosis with 
the same stimuli, the question of whether a MeG is a general phenomenon, a specific 
phenomenon, or a combination thereof remains unclear. Due to overall human memory biases, 
one might expect that a MeG exits for all experiences and all populations. However, due to 
population-specific biases and population characteristics, (e.g. slower reaction times when angry 
faces are displayed in individuals with a diagnosis of SP), the magnitude of MeG could 
potentially be larger for some specific experiences in specific populations. Furthermore, most 
studies that have reported a MeG used paper-and-pencil diaries without a time-stamp function. 
Participants have been shown to miss-schedule the recording of their experiences within a paper 
diaries, as they allow the participants to complete the assessments at a later time (Davidson, 
Anestis, & Gutierrez, 2017). Overall, using retrospectively assessed methods is prone to 
recollection biases itself (Trull & Ebner-Priemer, 2013), because individuals are asked to recall a 
past event, and are not asked to report what happened in their close present. Some have used the 
day reconstruction method to reduce error and bias. Day reconstruction measure has been shown 
to indeed reproduce valid information of daily affect (Dockray et al., 2010). However, assessing 
the MeG using ESM and specifically via cellular phones or smartphones has previously been 
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recommended (Gloster et al., 2008; Miron-Shatz et al., 2009; Trull & Ebner-Priemer, 2013), as 
the assessment is even closer to the real time of the experience. The use of smartphone in the 
general population is increasing, it includes the advantages of palm size computer and permits, 
with the technological advances (sending messages, apps) a more flexible way of collecting data 
(Davidson et al., 2017). 
This study extends the literature on the MeG by examining this gap using time-stamped 
ESM for individuals diagnosed with MDD or SP and for individuals without such diagnosis with 
respect to experiences of sadness, social anxiety, happiness, and physical activity. We 
hypothesized that a MeG is present in all three groups (MDD, SP, and control) for experiences of 
sadness, social anxiety, happiness, and physical activity (hypothesis one). We further 
hypothesized that participants in the control group would differ with respect to the size of the 
MeG from participants in the MDD and in the SP group (hypothesis two). Specifically, we 
expect that for sadness and social anxiety the MeG would be larger for individuals in the MDD 
and SP group compared to participants in the control group.  
Methods 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 290 individuals: participants were diagnosed with either SP or 
MDD, or they were in the control group that had neither SP or MDD. Eight participants in the 
control group met criteria for a primary diagnosis of either cannabis abuse, specific phobia, panic 
disorder without agoraphobia, obsessive compulsive disorder or insomnia. The MDD and the SP 
groups had some overlap of diagnoses at lower severity levels. 31.92% of the individuals in the 
MDD group had a comorbid diagnosis of social phobia and 23.73% of the individuals in the SP 
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group had a comorbid depression diagnosis. Detailed description of co-morbidities can be 
viewed within supplementary material. That is, group assignment was made based on the 
primary diagnosis, but co-morbidity of diagnoses at a lower severity level was allowed. Our goal 
was to recruit a sample representative of clinical reality and therefore generalizable sample; as 
such allowed commodities with lower severity levels as opposed to recruiting a highly selective 
and clinically atypical group consisting only of mono-diagnostic groups. It was further our 
assumption that if this did affect the results, it was against the direction of our hypotheses 
because groups without comorbidity would artificially inflate differences between the groups.  
Patients were recruited from treatment centers (university clinics and cooperating local 
practitioners) in Switzerland and Germany. Participants in the control group were recruited 
through local advertisements (flyers were distributed in local stores and the study was advertise 
via an online blackboard). Participation for the study occurred independent of therapy. Six 
participants reported on less than 50% of the ESM assessments and where therefore excluded 
from the study. The final sample size consisted of 118 participants in the MDD, 47 in the SP, and 
119 in the control group. The sample was 67% female. The average age was 32 years (SD = 
11.52, range 18–63). The three groups were matched for age and sex. In order to guarantee that 
the three groups had similar mean age and gender distribution, we specified the age and sex of 
participants to be recruited in the control group to match the general age brackets of participants 
in the MDD and SP groups. Overall, participants responded to 92% of the prompted ESM 
assessments, for a total of N = 10979 assessments. Of these, 51 were only partially completed. 
Leaving, N = 10928 assessments (92%) that were fully completed. Further demographic 
information such as employment status, years of education and number of diagnosis can be 
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viewed in table 1. The sample size is adequately powered for the hypothesis (Gloster et al., 2017) 
and was specifically designed to test the generalizability. 
[Table 1 near here] 
Procedure 
The data is part of a larger longitudinal study and was approved by the Ethikkommission 
Nordwest- und Zentralschweiz (EKNZ – 236-12). Detailed descriptions of the study design and 
procedure are presented elsewhere (Gloster et al., 2017). At baseline, participants gave informed 
consent, answered demographic questions, filled out questionnaires on symptoms, emotion 
regulation, and well-being, and completed a diagnostic interview. To assure the reliability of the 
diagnoses, each patients’ diagnoses was discussed with a senior clinical psychologist. Depending 
on the diagnostic status of each participant (DSM-IV MDD diagnosis, DSM-IV SP diagnosis or 
no DSM-IV diagnosis for MDD or SP), was then assigned to one of the three study groups: 
MDD, SP, or control. One week after the baseline assessment, participants received an ESM 
training, that is, they were given the smartphone they were going to use for the next 7 days and 
were trained how to fill out questionnaires on it. Between the ESM training (day 8) and the last 
appointment (day 15), participants completed questionnaires on the smartphone contingent on an 
audible signal every 3 hours during each day (six prompts during each day). Items for sadness, 
social anxiety, happiness, and physical activity were asked 5 times a day. The last questionnaire 
was assessed shortly before bed-time of each participant (e.g. 8 a.m., 11 a.m., 2 p.m., 5 p.m., 8 
p.m., and 11 p.m.). The first morning questionnaire only included few items to reduce burden of 
the participant. The participants returned the device at the last appointment. During the post 
assessment, participants were asked to recall experiences they had recorded on the smartphone 
during the previous seven days. The participants also filled out further questionnaires. All 
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assessments were conducted in German.  
Assessments  
Diagnostic 
At baseline, trained PhD students and master’s students performed the Axis I of the 
Structured Clinical Interview (SCID-I) to determine the diagnostic status of each participant.  
The SCID-I is a semi-structured clinical interview that is designed to determine DSM-IV 
conform diagnoses (Wittchen, Wunderlich, Gruschwitz, & Zaudig, 1997). The SCID-I is a 
reliable and valid instrument for assessing Axis I diagnosis (First & Gibbon, 2004). Lobbestael, 
Leurgans, and Arntz (2011) show moderate to excellent inter-rater with a mean Kappa of 0.71.  
Furthermore, participants were asked at baseline to fill out the Beck Depressive Inventory 
(BDI-II; Hautzinger, Keller, & Kühner, 2009), the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; 
Mattick & Clarke, 1998), the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen & Janicki-Deverts, 2012) and 
the short form of the Mental Health Continuum (MHC-SF; Lamers, Westerhof, Bohlmeijer, 
Klooster, & Keyes, 2010).  
The BDI-II (Hautzinger et al., 2009) contains 21 items designed to assess depressive 
symptomatology and suicidal ideation over the preceding two weeks. One-week test–retest 
reliability for the BDI-II is .93 and internal consistency is .92 among outpatients (Beck, Steer, & 
Brown, 1996).  
 The 20 items version of the SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998) was used to measure social 
anxiety, specifically participants reaction to situations that involve social interactions. The 
instrument scales from 0 “not at all” to 4 “extremely”. The been shown to be a valid instrument 
(Brown et al., 1997). 
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The PSS (Cohen & Janicki-Deverts, 2012) is most widely used to measure stress scale 
from 0 “never” to 4 “very often”. High scores on the items represent high level of perceived 
stress. The instrument show good validity and reliability. We used the 10 items version. The PSS 
shows high reliability and validity (Roberti, Harrington, & Storch, 2006). 
Finally, the MHC-SF (Lamers et al., 2010) is a reliable (Keyes, 2005) and valid (Keyes, 
2006; Lamers et al., 2010) measurement for well-being. Overall, 14 items measure emotional 
well-being (happy, interested in life, and satisfied), psychological well-being (self-acceptance, 
environmental mastery, positive relations with others, personal growth, autonomy, purpose in 
life) and social well-being (social contribution, social integration, social actualization, social 
acceptance, social coherence). Scaling go from 0 “never” to 5 “every day”. High score represents 
high level of well-being. 
Memory–experience gap 
To measure the MeG, we assessed the level of sadness, social anxiety, happiness, and 
physical activity of each participant several times during the ESM week and once again during 
the post assessment. We chose to measure the experiences of sadness and social anxiety because 
they represent experiences that are characteristic for individuals with a MDD and a SP diagnosis. 
We further chose the experience of happiness as a specific affect and the experience of physical 
activity as an observable behavior since those experiences are present across all individuals. The 
items asking for the level of, sadness, social anxiety, happiness, and physical activity originated 
from previous ESM studies (Brown, Strauman, Barrantes-Vidal, Silvia, & Kwapil, 2011; Gloster 
et al., 2008; Kashdan & Steger, 2006), validated questionnaires (Beck et al., 1996; Bundesamt 
für Statistik, 2013), and self-developed items. Items were modified to query for sadness, social 
anxiety, happiness and physical activity since the last assessment (ESM items) or were queried 
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for the previous week (retrospective items). Based on the BDI-II (Hautzinger et al., 2009) and 
previous ESM studies sadness (Brown et al., 2011) was assessed with the wording “did you feel 
sad”. Based on a previous ESM study from (Kashdan & Steger, 2006) social anxiety was 
assessed with the wording “were you worried about what people think about you?”. The item 
happiness was adapted from a previous study from Brown and colleagues (2011). The item was 
formulated; “were you happy?”. Finally, physical activity was adapted by a previous publication 
from a swiss health survey (Bundesamt für Statistik, 2013) with the wording “engaged in a 
physical activity leading to sweating for at least 30 minutes?”. The items sadness, social anxiety 
and happiness ranged from 0 “never” to 100 “always”, and the item physical activity was 
dichotomous “yes”/ “no” for the ESM item and from 0-7 days for the retrospective item. 
Specifically, ESM items began with the words: ‘Since the last beep, what percentage of time did 
you . . .’; whereas retrospective items (after the ESM week) began with the words: ‘On average 
during the last 7 days, what percentage of time did you . . .’ (table 2).  
[Table 2 near here] 
Statistical Analysis 
All analyses were conducted using the statistical program R, version 3.3.2 (2016/10/31). 
To analyze our two hypotheses, linear mixed models were conducted, which are well suited for 
repeated assessment measurements with interdependent observations of data nested within 
individuals. The outcome was the respective MeG, which was obtained by subtracting the 
repeatedly assessed and hence time-varying ESM based characteristics from the retrospectively 
assessed characteristics, which was assessed once. Thus, the resulting difference score was also 
time-varying an estimate of the experienced MeG at each point in time.  
GENERAL OR SPECIFIC? THE MEMORY-EXPERIENCE GAP.  
 
14 
For hypothesis one, we ran a separate model for each study group and outcome. The 
model contained only a fixed and a random intercept, but no predictors since we were interested 
deviations of the outcome from 0. The fixed intercept thereby tested the presence of a MeG for a 
specific study group. To test whether the magnitude of the MeGs differed among the three study 
groups (hypothesis 2) we combined the data of the three study groups and added study group as a 
fixed effect to the model used for hypothesis one. The analysis of the outcome physical activity 
differs from the other tested experiences, in that participants were retrospectively asked to report 
the number of days in a week that they exercised while in the ESM assessment participants were 
asked whether they had engaged in a physical activity. Therefore, this outcome was only 
available on a weekly basis (and not several times a day as for the other outcomes) and varied 
between 0 and 7. We consequently used a paired t-test to analyze this outcome with the two 
methods of assessing the weekly number of physical activity (via ESM or retrospectively) as 
factor.  
Results 
During the ESM assessment (in vivo experience), across all participants reported that 
they were sad, socially anxious and happy, 28%, 27% and 50% of the time, respectively. They 
were further engaged in physical activity on 2.77 days during the ESM week (self-reported via 
ESM). Table 3 gives further information on the characteristics of the three groups, separately for 
these smartphone and retrospective assessments.  
[Table 3 near here] 
Hypothesis 1 
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Figure 1 and figure 2 graphically depict the results of the first hypothesis. That is, they 
show the presence of a MeG for participants in the MDD, SP, and control groups with respect to 
experiences of sadness, social anxiety, happiness, and physical activity. 
Sadness and Social anxiety 
 First, linear mixed models showed that participants in the control group significantly 
overestimated their levels of sadness (by 2.55, p < 0.01, 95% CI [0.65-4.45]) when recalling 
them retrospectively in comparison to measuring it with ESM. With respect to social anxiety, 
participants in the control group did not show any indication of a MeG (0.19 difference between 
the retrospective recall and ESM, p = 0.81, 95 % CI [-1.43 – 1.81]).). 
Participants in the MDD group strongly overestimated both their levels of sadness (by 
12.52, p < 0.001, 95% CI [9.60– 15.44]), and their level of social anxiety (by 11.58, p < 0.001, 
95 % CI [8.45–14.71]) when recalling them retrospectively. Similarly, participants in the SP 
group also overestimated both their levels of sadness (by 6.05, p < 0.001, 95% CI [2.53 – 9.58]), 
and even more so of social anxiety (by 13.31, p < 0.001, 95% CI [10.59–16.44]) when recalling 
them retrospectively. 
Happiness  
Participants in the control group overestimated their levels of happiness by 6.55 when recalling it 
retrospectively in comparison to measuring it in vivo (p < 0.001, 95% CI [4.55–8.55]). In contrast, 
participants in the MDD more or less accurately recalled their happiness (difference 1.10 
compared to levels of happiness measured in vivo, p = 0.31, 95% CI [-1.02–3.22]). Similar to 
participants in the control group, though to a lesser degree, participants in the SP group 
overestimated their levels of happiness by 4.50 when recalling it retrospectively in comparison to 
their in vivo reports (p = 0.01, 95% CI [0.98–8.02]).  
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Physical Activity 
Regarding physical activity, participants in all three groups retrospectively underestimated the 
number of days they had engaged in physical activity (figure 2). Participants in the control group 
underestimated the days they had engaged in a physical activity by -0.34 (p = 0.013, 95% CI [-
0.77–-0.21]), as well as participants in the MDD group by -0.27 (p = 0.03, 95% CI  [-0.61– -
0.12]), and participants in the SP group by -0.37  ( p = 0.03, 95% CI  [-0.84 – -0.16]). 
Hypothesis 2 
The size of the MeG differed among participants in the control group and participants in 
the MDD group across most experienced characteristics. The MeG (represented by a 
overestimation) was hereby significantly higher for sadness (by 10.06, p < 0.001, 95% CI  [6.43-
13.30]) ) and social anxiety (by 11.33, p < 0.001, 95% CI  [7.86– 14.91]) in participants in the 
MDD group and significantly lower for participants in the MDD group for happiness (by -5.58, p 
< 0.001, 95% CI  [-8.40 – -2.49]). Participants in the control group and participants in the MDD 
group did not differ in their MeG for the experience of physical activity.  
The MeG (represented by a overestimation) for the experience of social anxiety also 
differed significantly between participants in the control group and participants in the SP group 
(by 13.12, p < 0.001, 95% CI [8.42–17.84]), with a higher gap for participants in the SP group. 
However, for all other experienced characteristics (sadness, happiness and physical activity) 
participants in the control group and participants in the SP group showed no differences in their 
MeGs.   
[Figure 1 and 2 near here] 
Discussion 
Discussion of the results  
GENERAL OR SPECIFIC? THE MEMORY-EXPERIENCE GAP.  
 
17 
This study examined whether participants’ experiences and memories (MeG) differed 
both within and between participants in an MDD, participants in an SP, and participants in a 
control group. Overall, our findings suggest that the MeG (usually an overestimation) exists 
across participants in the MDD, participants in the SP, and participants in the control group alike, 
but that the size of the recall bias (how much is overestimated/underestimated) depends on the 
study groups.  
Our first hypothesis—that a MeG exists for participants in the MDD, SP, and control 
groups—was generally confirmed for the internal experiences of sadness, social anxiety, 
happiness, as well as the discreet experience of physical activity. We found a MeG for symptom 
specific experiences, specifically, an overestimation of sadness and social anxiety in individuals 
with symptoms of MDD or SP, respectively. Each group showed the largest overestimation with 
respect to the experience that is salient to that group – interestingly, this effect was not limited to 
negative affect, but encompasses positive affect (in participants in the control group), too. These 
results are in line with previous studies that have shown that patients with a diagnosis of chronic 
pain and patients with a diagnosis of eating disorders overestimated the intensity and frequency 
of their symptom specific experiences (Stein & Corte, 2003; Stone et al., 2004). Furthermore, 
this result is in line with previous studies that have shown a MeG for happiness in women 
(Miron-Shatz et al., 2009; Tadic et al., 2013). The different amplitudes of MeGs between 
participants with a MDD or SP diagnosis, and without such diagnosis have previously not been 
described and extend our knowledge on the MeG, and suggest that the MeG occurs in stimuli 
that are most salient within each person’s idiographic profile.  
Interestingly, participants in the MDD group overestimated with a high magnitude all 
assessed symptom specific experiences (sadness and social anxiety), whereas participants in the 
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SP group also overestimated both symptom specific experiences but with a clearly higher 
magnitude for the experience of social anxiety. Additionally, only participants in the control and 
in the SP group overestimated happiness. In contrast participants in the MDD group accurately 
recalled that they had been happy approximately a third of the time – and this was lower in 
absolute levels than both participants in the SP and participants in the control group. The present 
results are congruent with the tripartite model of anxiety and depression (Clark & Watson, 1991). 
The model described shared components between depression and anxiety that explains the high 
co-morbidities between those disorders. Moreover, the model also refers to disorder specific 
components (such as hyperarousal specific for anxiety and low positive affect specific to 
depression) that account for differences between the two. As such, similarities between 
participants diagnosed with MDD and SP diagnosis could explain the general tendency of both to 
overestimate sadness and social anxiety and the differences between both for the experience of 
happiness.  
We also found a MeG for the experience of physical activity over all study groups. All 
groups significantly underestimated the number of days they had engaged in physical activity. 
This result adds to the literature because, to the best of our knowledge, the MeG for physical 
activity has not yet been assessed. Nevertheless, previous studies on the MeG for other 
observable experiences, such as tobacco consumption, have also shown a MeG (Shiffman et al., 
1997).  
Using this methodology, we documented that individuals with a diagnosis of MDD or SP 
are off by between 6 and 13 percent when they retrospectively estimate the identical information. 
Importantly, this estimate is probably a best-case scenario because the participants were 
prompted every three hours to think about these experiences. As such, these rates likely 
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underestimate the actual MeG present when questionnaires or interviews are used without prior 
prompting.  
Our second hypothesis, which stated that participants in the MDD, the SP and the Control 
group would differ from each other in the size of their MeG, was confirmed. The results indicate 
significant group differences in the magnitude of the different MeGs. The MeG (represented by a 
overestimation) for the experience of sadness was larger for participants in the MDD group 
compared to participants in the control group. In contrast, participants in the SP and participants 
in the Control group did not significantly differ from each other with respect to sadness. But 
when the MeG was analyzed for social anxiety, the MDD and SP groups had both higher MeGs 
(represented by a overestimation) than the participants in the control group. An opposite result 
could be shown for the MeG for the experience of happiness and physical activity, as such as the 
MeG (represented by a overestimation for happiness and a underestimation for physical activity) 
was larger for participants in the control group compared to participants in the MDD group. 
These results of the second hypothesis are in line with the previous findings from Miron-Shatz 
and colleges (2009), and Ganzach  and Yaor (2019). The MeG was indeed larger for negative 
affect compared to positive affect, this however was specific to individuals with depression or 
social anxiety. Which speaks for the fact that individuals with a diagnosis of depression or SP 
have specific characteristics or experiences that further increase a MeG for negative experiences 
(e.g. specific population biases or higher negative peaks). Furthermore, it seems that the MeG is 
indeed a general phenomenon, as all our study groups reported discrepancies, but that the 
presence of the gap and the size of it is related to specific populations (MDD group, SP group, or 
control group). 
Theoretical contributions 
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To our knowledge this study is the first to show population specific differences in the 
MeG. A consistent and overall theme of our results is the tendency of participants in the control 
group to report a higher magnitude in the MeG (reported as an overestimation) in happiness 
compared to participants in the MDD and SP group. The MeG in participants with a MDD or SP 
diagnoses was nearly the opposite pattern of the MeG in participants in the control group. It has 
previously been claimed that individuals without a diagnosis of depression have cognitive biases 
that enable them to see themselves and their environment in a positive light (Alloy & Abramson, 
1979). This self-attribution bias (e.g., making internal attributions for successes and external 
attributions for failures; Alloy & Abramson, 1981) has been described as an adaptive strategy 
that maintains a sense of well-being (Ackermann & DeRubeis, 1991). Overestimating happiness 
could therefore also have a protective function for mental disorders. Overestimating sadness and 
social anxiety could hypothetically be a result of diagnostically specific attentional biases toward 
mood-congruent experiences in individuals with symptoms of depression (Mathews & MacLeod, 
2005) and toward threatening experiences in individuals with symptoms of social anxiety (Mogg 
et al., 2004). A crucial question that further studies need to address is whether these cognitive 
biases explain the different size of the MeG and, further, if an overestimation of happiness is a 
protective factor for the development of mental disorders whereas an overestimation of 
diagnostically specific experiences is a risk factor for the development and maintenance of 
mental disorder, in addition to other cognitive and behavioral factors. 
Practical Implication 
These findings are of use for clinical practice and research. Next to other validated 
assessment and treatment components, researchers and clinicians should consider adding ESM 
more often in therapy and research since our results clearly show that information assessed 
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through retrospective recall is biased. As such clinicians could for example show patients the 
discrepancy between their weekly assessed symptoms, and their retrospectively remembered 
symptoms.  As a result, this could promote in therapy cognitive reconstruction and increase the 
patient’s motivation for improving their daily mindfulness to reduce the memory-experience gap. 
Methods of cognitive reconstruction and mindfulness have previously been shown to reduce 
symptoms and increase individual’s well-being (Clark & Beck, 2010; Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & 
Oh, 2010). Another practical implication could be to strengthen positive view as a potential 
protective factor of psychopathologies. Previous findings show that more happiness is related to 
less psychopathological symptoms (Garaigordobil, 2015), and is related to more success in 
several life domains, such as work, relationships and physical health (Lyubomirsky, King, & 
Diener, 2005). Hypothetically, it is not only the level of happiness that is a protective factor 
against psychopathologies, but also the presence of a memory-experience gap of happiness 
(specifically the overestimation of happiness) that acts as a protective factor. Future studies 
should therefore include the memory-experience gap of happiness, next to other well-known 
protective factors (e.g. coping strategies, social support; Roohafza et al., 2014)), as a predictor 
for psychopathologies to test this hypothesis.  
Limitations 
There are some limitations to this study that should be mentioned. First, although ESM is 
designed to collect real-time data, we used it to measure retrospectively recollected experiences 
from the previous 3 hours. Nevertheless, ESM permits data collection in vivo that is close to real 
time and thus drastically reduces the factors that make later recall biased. Furthermore, 
answering questions several times a day on a smartphone could pose a reactivity threat if it leads 
to participants recalling their weekly experiences better. If this is the case, we assume that if 
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anything, this resulted in an underestimation of the MeG in this study. Second, further variable 
could also confound with our results and explain a MeG.  
Conclusion 
These limitations notwithstanding, concluding this study extends the literature on ESM 
and the MeG by showing initial evidence of the memory-experience gap as a function of the 
interaction between diagnosis and targeted experience. We suggest that the differences of the 
MeG in patients with a diagnosis of MDD or SP and individuals without such diagnosis could 
contribute to the explanation of differences in the status of their psychological health. A MeG in 
happiness and positive experiences could contribute to psychological health, and a MeG in 
diagnostically specific experiences could contribute to the maintenance of symptoms. Further 
research is needed to test the function of the MeG as an amplifier for health or 
psychopathologies. 
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Tables 
Table 1  
Demographic information of the sample 
 Control MDD  SP 
Years of education in % 
8-10 
 
12.0 
 
21.1 
 
9.3 
11-13 53.0 51.4 67.4 
14+ 35.0 27.5 23.3 
Employment status 
% Employed  
 
57.1 
 
52.5 
 
38.3 
% Unemployed 39.5 46.6 61.7 
Number of diagnoses in %    
0 90.8 0.0 0.0 
1 6.7 45.8 44.7 
2 1.7 29.7 27.6 
3+ 0.8 24.6 27.7 
BDI Mean and (SD)    
 27.0 (8.2) 17.0 (11.7) 3.0 (7.1) 
SIAS Mean and (SD)    
 31.0 (14.4) 44.0 (12.5) 10.0 (7.3) 
PSS Mean and (SD)    
 27.0 (5.3) 25.0 (6.0) 13.0 (7.2) 
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MHC‐E Mean and (SD)    
 1.67 (0.96) 2.67 (1.12) 4.00 (0.92) 
MHC‐S Mean and (SD)    
 1.20 (0.94) 1.40 (0.96) 2.60 (1.14) 
MHC‐ P Mean and (SD)    
 1.75 (0.98) 2.17 (1.19) 3.50 (0.96) 
 
Note. Control = participants without a diagnosis of a major depressive disorder or social phobia, MDD = participants 
diagnosed with a major depressive disorder, SP = participants diagnosed with a social phobia; BDI‐II = Beck 
Depression Inventory; SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale; PSS = Perceived Stress Scale; MHC‐E, −S, −P = 
Mental Health Continuum – Emotional, Social, and Psychological subscales, SD = standard deviation. 
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Table 2 
Formulation of the event sampling method and retrospective items 
Type of 
experience 
ESM items Retrospective items Range  
Sadness Since the last beep, 
what percentage of 
the time did you feel 
sad? 
On average during 
the last 7 days, what 
percentage of the 
time did you feel 
sad? 
ESM & 
retrospective 
items: from 0 
(never) to 100 
always 
 
Social anxiety Since the last beep, 
what percentages of 
the time were you 
worried about what 
people think about 
you? 
On average during 
the last 7 days, what 
percentage of the 
time were you 
worried about what 
people think about 
you? 
 
ESM & 
retrospective 
items: from 0 
(never) to 100 
always 
Happiness Since the last beep, 
what percentage of 
the time were you 
happy? 
On average during 
the last 7 days, what 
percentage of the 
time were you 
happy? 
ESM & 
retrospective 
items: from 0 
(never) to 100 
always 
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Physical 
activity 
Since the last beep, 
have you engaged in 
a physical activity 
leading to sweating 
for at least 30 
minutes? 
How many days did 
you pursue a 
physical activity 
leading to sweating 
for at least 30 
minutes? 
ESM item: 
dichotomy 
scaling 
(Yes/No), 
Retrospective 
items: from 0 to 
7 days 
Note. ESM = items assessed via an event sampling method (smartphone).
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations of sadness, social anxiety and happiness and the Sum of the 
days individuals have engaged in a physical activity assessed through event sampling methods 
and retrospectively. 
  ESM Retrospective recall 
Sadness     
(Range: 0-100) Control 9.95 (13.11) 12.24 (16.50) 
 MDD 31.29 (20.37) 43.90 (27.96) 
 SP 22.64 (16.65) 28.02 (19.20) 
Social anxiety     
(Range: 0-100) Control 8.68 (9.45) 8.74 (11.31) 
 MDD 28.05 (19.82) 39.61 (29.44) 
 SP 28.46 (18.53) 41.12 (22.25) 
Happiness    
(Range: 0-100) Control 63.73 (23.95) 70.21 (26.43) 
 MDD 31.90 (19.48) 32.69 (22.85) 
 SP 35.11 (20.81) 39.54 (24.14) 
Physical activity    
(Range: 0-7 days) Control 3.67 (2.22) 3.25 (2.16) 
 MDD 2.69 (2.22) 2.33 (2.19) 
 SP 3.00 (2.20) 2.63 (2.10) 
 
Note. This table represents retrospective values and values assessed through an event sampling method (smartphone) 
for each group and each experience. The differences between retrospective recall and event sampling method 
represent approximately the memory-experience gap (MeG) calculated via GLLM. MeG scores can differ in the 
GLLM model, because GLLM model represent calculate estimated values. ESM = values assessed via an event 
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sampling method (smartphone), Control = participants without a diagnosis of a major depressive disorder or social 
phobia, MDD = participants diagnosed with a major depressive disorder, SP = participants diagnosed with a social 
phobia. 
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Figures 
 
Figure. 1 Group-specific memory-experience gap (MeG) for the experiences of happiness, social 
anxiety, and sadness. A MeG of 0 represents an accurate retrospective recall of the experience. 
Negative scores represent retrospective underestimations, and positive scores retrospective 
overestimations. Significant MeGs as well as significant between-group comparisons are coded 
in this figure on a p level of *** = p < 0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05.  Control = participants 
without a diagnosis of a major depressive disorder or social phobia, MDD = participants 
diagnosed with a major depressive disorder, SP = participants diagnosed with a social phobia. 
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Figure. 2 Group-specific MeG for physical activity. A memory-experience gap (MeG) of 0 
represents an accurate retrospective recall. Significant negative MeG scores represent 
retrospective underestimations of the number of days of physical activity. Significant MeGs are 
coded in this figure on a p level of *** = p < 0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05. No significant 
between-group comparisons were shown for the experience of physical activity. Control = 
participants without a diagnosis of a major depressive disorder or social phobia, MDD = 
participants diagnosed with a major depressive disorder, SP = participants diagnosed with a 
social phobia. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
Table  
Description of co-morbidities 
 
 Control 
(N = 119) 
MDD 
(N =118)  
SP 
(N = 47)  
ICD-
10 
code 
Description N % N % N % 
F10.1 Alcohol abuse 0 0 3 2.54 1 2.13 
F12.1 Cannabis abuse 0 0 1 0.85 0 0 
F30 Manic episode 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F30.9 
Manic episode, 
unspecified 0 0 1 0.85 0 0 
F32 
Major depressive disorder, 
single episode 0 0 0 0 13 27.66 
F33 
Major depressive disorder, 
recurrent 
0 
0 0 0 2 4.26 
F34.1 Dysthymic disorder 0 0 6 5.09 2 4.26 
F40.00 Agoraphobia, unspecified 0 0 5 4.24 2 4.26 
F40.01 
Agoraphobia with panic 
disorder 1 0.84 3 2.54 2 4.26 
F40.1 Social phobias 0 0 28 23.73 0 0 
F40.2 Specific (isolated) phobias 1 0.84 9 7.63 6 12.77 
F41.0 
Panic disorder without 
agoraphobia 
1 
0.84 6 5.09 1 2.13 
F41.1 
Generalized anxiety 
disorder 0 0 22 18.64 7 14.89 
F41.9 
Anxiety disorder, 
unspecified 0 0 2 1.70 0 0 
F42.0 
Predominantly obsessive 
compulsive cognition 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F42.1 
Predominantly obsessive 
compulsive behavior 1 0.84 4 3.39 1 2.13 
F42.2 
Obsessive compulsive 
cognition and behavior 2 1.68 2 1.70 1 2.13 
F42.8 
Obsessive compulsive 
disorder, unspecified 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F43.1 
Post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) 0 0 0 0 2 4.26 
F43.2 Adjustment disorders 0 0 1 0.85 0 0 
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F45.2 Hypochondriacal disorders 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F50.0 Anorexia nervosa 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F50.1 Atypical anorexia nervosa 0 0 0 0 1 2.13 
F50.2 Bulimia nervosa 0 0 4 3.39 3 6.38 
F50.8 Other eating disorders 0 0 3 2.54 0 0 
F50.9 
Eating disorder, 
unspecified 
0 
0 0 0 1 2.13 
F51.0 
Insomnia not due to a 
substance or known 
physiological condition 0 0 1 0.85 0 0 
Note. Control = participants without a diagnosis of a major depressive disorder or social phobia, MDD = participants 
diagnosed with a primary major depressive disorder, SP = participants diagnosed with a primary social phobia, % = 
percent of the participants for each group having this specific co-morbid diagnosis 
 
 
